Your Birthday Color - Yellow

Yellow symbolizes wisdom, joy, youth, hope and happiness. You are a sweet and loyal friend. Your friends trust you. Your sense of humor is loved by one and all. You are focused in your work and are known for your leadership skills.

Morse Code

What do all those dots and dashes mean? The invention of the telegraph was followed by the invention of the Morse code. Referred to in the Navy as the dot-dash system, each letter and number is represented by a particular arrangement of dots and dashes. Morse code is usable in sound signaling (radio, sound and whistle) and visual signaling (lights and flags).

Letter Code Letter Code Number Code
A .-         N -.          0 -----
B -...       O ---        1 .----
C -.-.       P .--.       2 ..---
D -..        Q --.-       3 ...--
E .           R .-.        4 ....-
F ..-.       S ...         5 .....
G --.        T -           6 -....
H ....       U ..-        7 --...
I ..           V ...-       8 ---..
J .---       W .--        9 ----.
K -.-        X -..-
L .-..       Y -.--
M --         Z --..

Meeting Dan Eyeball

Lokasi:  D Love Cafe-SP
Masa : 9:30pm - 1:20am

PULAU AMAN 27 - 28 MARCH 2010

Defense Programs
One of the primary missions of NNSA is to maintain and enhance the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  NNSA, through its Office of Defense Programs, ensures that the U.S. nuclear arsenal meets the country’s national security requirements and continues to serve its essential deterrence role.  In partnership with the Department of Defense, NNSA’s Defense Programs provides the research, development, secure transportation,  and production activities necessary to support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States discontinued production of new nuclear warheads and voluntarily ended underground nuclear testing.  Today, NNSA uses and oversees a wide-range of breakthrough science experiments, engineering audits and high-tech computer simulations, including extensive laboratory and flight tests of warhead components and subsystems, to keep the existing warheads reliable, secure and safe.  Every year, the Secretary of Energy is able to certify the reliability of the stockpile without conducting an underground nuclear test.  NNSA’s use of science-based research and development in the absence of underground nuclear testing in order to maintain the Department of Energy’s portion of the nation’s nuclear deterrent is known as the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
NNSA’s nuclear weapons activities are carried out in a nationwide complex of government-owned, contractor-operated national security laboratories, test site,  and nuclear weapons production sites.  These sites, collectively known as NNSA’s nuclear weapons complex, provide the necessary research, development and production capabilities needed to maintain the reliability, security and safety of the weapons stockpile.
Part of keeping the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile safe and reliable includes working with the Department of Defense to maintain the quantity and quality of weapons necessary for U.S. national security needs.  Under the Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia, the United States agreed to reduce the size of its operationally deployed nuclear weapons down to between 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012.  As a result of these actions, the stockpile is the smallest it has been since the Eisenhower administration.  NNSA’s Defense Programs is actively working to meet the reduced stockpile quantity levels by safely dismantling and disposing of those nuclear weapons that have been designated in excess of U.S. national security needs.
In addition to maintaining the actual weapons, NNSA is also focused on the security and safety of the weapons.  Robust security protects weapons and weapons material both at each facility and through securely transporting materials and weapons between facilities and military locations.  NNSA also strives to conduct operations in ways that that are safe for the environment and the public.
As threats against the country evolve and become more and more unpredictable, and especially as the current weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile age and become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain, NNSA is working now to transform itself and revitalize the entire nuclear weapons complex to be smaller, safer, more secure and more efficient.  NNSA must be better able  to quickly respond to technical problems in the stockpile and be able to rapidly respond to unforeseen national security needs.  Click here to learn more about NNSA’s transformation efforts.

Nuclear Nonproliferation
One of the gravest threats the United States and the international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Their continued pursuit of these weapons, along with related technologies, equipment, and expertise, increases the urgency of NNSA's efforts to:

• Detect nuclear and radiological materials, and WMD-related equipment;
• Secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials;
• Dispose of surplus weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials.

NNSA, through its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, works closely with a wide range of international partners, key U.S. federal agencies, the U.S. national laboratories, and the private sector to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material, and related WMD technology and expertise.

DetectNNSA is taking steps to deter and detect illicit transfers of weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment, prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear weapons technology and develop cutting-edge nuclear detection technologies.

NNSA’s work enhances the capabilities of our foreign partners to interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials by deploying radiation detection systems at high-risk border crossings, airports and seaports.  NNSA is particularly concerned that terrorists could use the global maritime shipping network to smuggle nuclear and radiological materials or warheads.  By installing radiation detection systems at major seaports throughout the world, NNSA strengthens the detection and interdiction capabilities of our partner countries.

NNSA also provides export control and WMD-awareness training to both domestic and foreign export control and customs officials, which strengthens the ability to deter and detect WMD-related technology transfers.  The tools that NNSA provides to partnering countries help prepare officials to recognize and identify dangerous materials and technologies that could be diverted for use against the United States and its allies.

NNSA is the principal federal sponsor of long-term nuclear nonproliferation-related research and development.  These investments focus on leading-edge, high-risk/high-payoff, basic and applied research, including testing and evaluation.  NNSA’s efforts lead to improvements in nuclear detection and characterization systems.  Additionally, in the area of nuclear detonation detection, NNSA provides operational hardware and software for national security systems.  These efforts provide the technical base for national and homeland security agencies to meet their nonproliferation, counterproliferation and counterterrorism responsibilities.

SecurePreventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction remains one of NNSA’s highest priorities.  NNSA helps to keep the world’s most dangerous materials out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people by securing nuclear weapons and nuclear and radiological materials at their source, and improving security practices around the world.

Since 1991, NNSA’s weapons and materials security programs have focused principally on Russia, due to the concentration of poorly secured material within the Russian Federation.  NNSA has made great progress cooperating with Russia to strengthen protection, control, and accounting of its nuclear weapons and materials.  Although these security upgrade efforts are largely drawing to a close after over a decade of work, NNSA will continue work at sites recently added to the program, and will continue to work cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and procedures already in place.

However, not all nuclear material is located in Russia.  NNSA is working with other partners to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials in additional parts of the world and to strengthen security at civil nuclear and radiological facilities.  One area of particular concern is research reactors, which often use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel otherwise suitable for bombs.  To mitigate this threat, NNSA converts research reactors around the world from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and returns HEU to the country of origin, either the U.S. or Russia.  Further, NNSA is also working to remove or secure significant quantities of excess, vulnerable radiological materials that exist worldwide and could be used to make a dirty bomb.

Additional nuclear security challenges concern the effectiveness and credibility of international nuclear safeguards and export controls.  Growing nuclear energy demand and concerns over the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies place increasing strain on international safeguards.  NNSA is working to update international nuclear safety standards to reflect present day challenges and to ensure sustained U.S. leadership and investment in nuclear nonproliferation technologies and expertise.

DisposeAn integral part of NNSA’s strategy to meet nonproliferation challenges has been to eliminate dangerous material altogether by encouraging other states to stop producing it, and to dispose of excess nuclear and radiological material.

For example, Russia still produces weapons-grade plutonium – not because it needs it for weapons, but because plutonium-producing nuclear reactors provide the sole source of heat and electricity to local communities.  NNSA is helping to replace that heat and electricity generation capacity, thereby eliminating Russia’s plutonium production.

NNSA is also disposing of substantial quantities of surplus weapons-grade HEU that results from the dismantlement of thousands of U.S. warheads, and is working to reduce the large stocks of excess HEU that are now being returned to the U.S. and Russia.  Once weapons-usable HEU is downblended, or converted, to low enriched uranium, it can be used for fuel in commercial reactors and becomes unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons.

In addition to HEU disposition efforts, NNSA is overseeing efforts to dispose of U.S. and Russian weapons-grade plutonium.  The weapons-grade plutonium will be converted to mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel which, once irradiated in commercial reactors, will no longer be suitable for use in nuclear weapons.

US trains nuclear detectives to trace 'loose' nukes

As nuclear safety concerns rise, the US government is building a stable of nuclear detectives – offering summer internships to those interested in radiochemistry nuclear forensics.

• 

Julie Gostic at Lawrence Livermore National Lab works with a flow-through chemical automation system. The US government is training a new wave of nuclear scientists to help it stay up to date on nuclear forensics.

Jacqueline McBride/Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

It was not Urskan Hanifi’s night.

Skip to next paragraph

Related Stories

• Opinion: Three steps to reducing nuclear terrorism
• Obama's nuclear power policy: a study in contradictions?
• Clinton hints more work needed on nuclear reduction treaty with Russia

He was stopped at a border checkpoint just after midnight, crossing from Romania into Bulgaria, when guards doing a routine inspection of his car turned up documents written in Russian – including one that described a shipment of uranium.

It was enough to make the guards suspicious. Popping the trunk, they found an air compressor inside, and upon closer inspection a tiny amount of highly enriched uranium, encased in a small glass vial, encased in wax, encased in a lead container.

Busted.

The uranium in this nuclear-age nesting doll wasn’t weapons-grade, but it was sufficiently enriched to suggest that the batch it came from could be turned into a crude atomic bomb.

But where did it come from? And who performed a serious enrichment job on it?

Those questions, still largely unanswered in the 1999 Hanifi event, exemplify the kind of puzzle that falls to scientists involved in the small but vital field of nuclear forensics. Call it “CSI Atomic.” Now, almost a decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US government wants to ensure its nuclear forensics proficiency – and an adequate stable of scientists who know their way around radioactive materials.

The Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Act, signed into law last month, aims to improve coordination among US agencies that probe cases of nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. And it encourages tighter international cooperation in probing incidents beyond US soil.

But just as important, it is designed to attract a fresh crop of scientists to the field, in recognition of a looming shortage of such expertise as current scientists near retirement. Scholarships for undergrads, fellowships for PhD candidates, and research awards to professors teaching in relevant fields are the government’s incentives.

In return for the PhD fellowships, graduates must work two years at a national lab or at other federal agencies that help investigate nuclear terrorism or illegal trafficking.

Federal agencies already were beefing up their ability to trace radioactive materials to their sources – either samples intercepted during an investigation or, in the worst case, residue collected after a “dirty” bomb or nuclear device detonates. Still, the new law gives these efforts a more formal status, something that is “gratifying” to William Daitch, head of the Department of Homeland Security’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) in Washington.

Politicians from former Vice President Dick Cheney to President Obama have recently identified nuclear terrorism as America’s most serious security threat. A key reason for their concern: a steady drumbeat of attempted or actual incidents of nuclear-materials trafficking.

Between 1993, when the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency began gathering data on illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, and 2008, the agency received 336 confirmed reports of criminal activity involving nuclear material. The IAEA logged another 421 incidents of stolen or lost nuclear material worldwide. Since 1995, reported incidents have averaged 19 a year.

Moreover, the soil for nuclear mischief may be getting more fertile. Nuclear energy worldwide seems poised for expansion, and, in the West, worries abound about Iran’s nuclear program. The ongoing US-Russia effort to retire more nuclear warheads, if successful, may increase the risk that decommissioned nuclear material could be stolen if adequate safeguards are not in place.

At the same time, a shortage of nuclear forensics experts looms, experts say, citing unclassified reports on the field and a soon-to-be-released study from the National Academy of Sciences.

Skip to next paragraph

Related Stories

• Opinion: Three steps to reducing nuclear terrorism
• Obama's nuclear power policy: a study in contradictions?
• Clinton hints more work needed on nuclear reduction treaty with Russia

Indeed, these days just 60 researchers – mainly at the national labs – have experience in nuclear forensics, and none of them works full time on it, says Benn Tannenbaum of the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).

Why so few? Many people with the skills to conduct nuclear forensic investigations opt for higher-paying jobs in other sectors, such as nuclear medicine or nuclear power.

Then, too, the US government ended underground nuclear-weapons testing in 1992, reducing the demand for a corps of full-time scientists who analyze test results and devise technologies to increase the precision and speed of that analysis, says Mr. Daitch at NTNFC.

But there’s much work yet to do, says the AAAS’s Dr. Tannenbaum. “We’re still not at the limits of physics as far as how accurate our measurements can be or how fast [they] can be taken.”

To attract young scientists into radiochemistry and nuclear forensics, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., finds summer internships to be a promising avenue for piquing the interest of undergraduates, says Nancy Hutcheon, who administers the lab’s program, funded by the NTNFC. At least six students “are doing graduate-thesis work that in some way is involved with the nuclear forensics arena,” she says.

One is Greg Brennecka, an Arizona State University student working toward a PhD in isotope geochemistry – a field that studies the abundance of chemical elements and their isotopes, including radioactive isotopes. Mr. Brennecka has spent several summers interning with the lab’s nuclear forensic scientists. Once he finishes at ASU, he says, he may wind up at another university doing research. “But over the long term, I would like to something like Livermore’s nuclear forensics program.”

One of his projects there: developing ways to help pinpoint which of the 150 uranium mines that ever existed on the planet a sample came from.

On TV, forensic scientists of every ilk produce results in no time, but the reality is slower – and Daitch acknowledges the potential for enormous pressure for quick results. Nuclear forensic scientists are working toward that end, but the Hanifi case illustrates the difficulties.

Nine months after Bulgaria confiscated the vial of uranium, the US requested the sample. It took another nine months for Lawrence Livermore scientists to finish their analysis. Physical traits of the sample indicate it came from outside the US. Traces of paper pointed to Europe as the source for the trees. The glass vial appeared to be similar to those used at nuclear-fuel reprocessing plants to archive samples.

As for Hanifi? He served a short prison sentence in Bulgaria and was fined the equivalent of $900. Soon after his release, Hanifi went home to Moldova and reportedly died a short time later under mysterious circumstances.

Patrick Grant, with the lab’s Forensics Science Center, says the material’s source remains uncertain, although some reports suggest that the uranium came from a nuclear-fuel reprocessing facility in Russia. In effect, it is a nuclear “cold case.”

Still, there are promising approaches to speeding an investigation.

One is to use high-speed supercomputers to model potential terrorist nuclear devices. The intent is to build a virtual archive of devices against which investigators can compare what they may one day find in the field.

Another is to use lasers to speed the analysis of a sample. Typically, samples must be first dissolved in a fluid, which can take hours, explains Michael Carter, who heads counterterrorism research at Lawrence Livermore. Laser preparation may make samples available for analysis much faster.

Pemberitahuan: Semakan Pemohonan Menduduki Peperiksaan Radio Amatur Siri Pertama Tahun 2010 (RAE2010-1) 19/03/2010

http://rae.skmm.gov.my/semak.asp

March 24 - April 7 Oahu and Kauai Hawaii

Adrian, AA5UK, will be on Oahu (BL11) and Kauai (BL02ic & BL01) operating portable KH6. He plans to operate on the Linear and FM satellites during his stay, mostly from his rented house in BL02ic (March 27th through April 5th) and will try to operate portable/mobile from BL11 and BL01 time permitting. Emphasis will be SSB on FO-29, VU-52, AO-7 and HO-68. He will post daily availability via AMSAT BB,his QRZ page and Twitter: @AA5UK. Schedule requests are encouraged due to the limited pass windows for those operators needing HI for WAS at the fringe of the footprints. Please use the email listed on QRZ.com to arrange for a time and date.Publish Post

Opportunities for Satellite DX Begin March 19

April 10 - April 18 Côn Có Island Viet Nam
The 3W6C-Team will activate Côn Có Island (AS-185) near Viet Nam on satellites from April 10-18, 2010. The crew use a FT-897 transceiver with home brewed "Easysat" antenna for 2m and 70cm and a home brewed 10m cross dipole for AO-7 Mode A. The team plans to use AO-07*, AO-51*, HO-68*, SO-50, and SO-67. (*first priority on passes when the satellite team is available.) AO-07 will be activated in SBB/CW-mode and ll other satellites will be in FM mode. For additional information and operating-plan, please see the 3W6C Website 

March 23 - April 23 Thule Greenland
Reid, N0RC plans to operate on FM satellites from Thule, Greenland (Grid FQ56) for one month starting March 23. Reid describes his plans, "I will try to use satellites that uplink on VHF, because my transmissions on UHF would interfere with the BMEWS radar on base. I'll need to determine if BMEWS interferes with UHF downlink which will affect my satellite operation." Reid's schedule will be as work/passes/weather permits. He plans to primarily operate the FM satellites due to equip- ment limitations. He plans some HF operating in between passes. Look for OX3RC on the satellites and on HF starting March 23. He will send out an email right before he goes on the air for an available time period. Reid has setup an email list on Google Groups

March 19 - April 2 Turkey  



Rick, WA4NVM will be operating as TA/WA4NVM from Turkey, time permitting on the FM satellites. Below is a list of his planned itinerary:
March 20-22 Istanbul, Turkey KN41/ March 22-23 Canakkale, Turkey KN30 / March 23-25 Kusadasi, Turkey KM37 / March 25-27 Pamukkale, Turkey KM47 / March 27-29 Antalya, Turkey KM56 March 29-31 Cappadocia, Turkey KM78 / March 31-April 02 Istanbul, Turkey KN41

March 20 - March 27 Scotland
Paul, 2E1EUB operating as 2M1EUB from his holiday QTH in northeastern Scotland, about 50 miles west of Aberdeen in the Caringnorms National Park. He will be active on HF and satellites.

Family Day SPHAM Teluk Nipah Picture

Morse Resource Links Page

Morse Resource Links Page

Morse, Morse Code, morse keys, telegraph keys

Morse, Morse Code, morse keys, telegraph keys

Date:	Saturday, March 20, 2010
Time:	9:00am - 10:00am
Location:	SMT TAIPING, KEMUNTING, PERAK

Description

Ruj. Kami : astra/SUK/01/10(023)
Tarikh : 10 Mac 2010

Semua Ahli ASTRA


Tuan/Puan,

MAJLIS MEMETERAI PERJANJIAN PERSEFAHAMAN

Perkara di atas adalah dirujuk dengan hormatnya.

2. Suatu Perjanjian Persefahaman (MoU) di antara ASTRA dengan Bulan Sabit Merah Malaysia (BSMM) akan ditandatangani seperti ketetapan berikut;

Tarikh : Sabtu, 20 Mac 2010
Tempat : Dewan SMT Taiping, 34600 Kamunting, Perak
Masa : 9:00 am – 10 am

3. Perjanjian Persefahaman ini adalah untuk menyatakan persefahaman di dalam mewujudkan bidang kerjasama bagi membangunkan ’Sistem Komunikasi Radio Dua Hala’ bagi kegunaan ahli-ahli BSMM dan mewujudkan ’Konsep Bantuan Radio Bencana’ menggunakan tenaga dan kepakaran ASTRA.

4. Oleh yang demikian, semua ahli adalah dijemput untuk menyaksikan detik bersejarah ini di samping menghadiri Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan ASTRA Ke 13. Bersama ini dinyatakan tentatif majlis untuk perhatian semua tuan/puan.

MASA AKTIVITI
9:00 am Para tetamu dan ahli ASTRA berkumpul di Dewan SMT Taiping.
9:10 am Nyanyian Lagu Negaraku
9:15 am Ucapan Aluan Pengerusi Majlis
Bacaan Doa
9:20 am Ucapan Presiden ASTRA – 9M2RR Abd. Rahim Bin Abd. Rahman.
9:30 am Ucapan Wakil BSMM - Dr. Hj. Wan Azhar Bin Hj. Wan Ali, Pengerusi Jawatankuasa Pembangunan Organisasi, BSMM.
9:40 am Majlis Memeterai Perjanjian Persefahaman
10:00 am Minum Pagi & Sidang Akhbar




5. Bagi ahli yang ingin mengetahui butiran draf perjanjian persefahaman ini, sila layari laman sesawang ASTRA, http://www.astra.org.my.

Sekian, harap maklum.

“BERSAHABAT MELALUI UDARA”

Yang menjalankan tugas,

t.t

(NORUL AMIN BIN HAMSAN, 9W2MYR)
Setiausaha Kehormat ASTRA

Date:	Saturday, March 20, 2010
Time:	8:20am - 11:20am
Location:	SMT TAIPING, KEMUNTING, PERAK

NOTIS PEMBERITAHUAN MESYUARAT AGONG TAHUNAN ASTRA KALI KE 13

NOTIS ini adalah diberi untuk memaklumkan bahawa Mesyuarat Agong Tahunan ASTRA Kali Ke 13 akan diadakan seperti ketetapan berikut:

Tarikh : Sabtu, 20 Mac 2010
Tempat : Dewan SMT Taiping, 34600 Kamunting, Perak
Masa Pendaftaran : 9.00 pagi
Masa Mesyuarat : 10.00 pagi

AGENDA MESYUARAT
1. Melantik Pengerusi Mesyuarat
2. Melantik 2 orang Pencatit Minit Mesyuarat
3. Ucapan Presiden & Perasmian
4. Laporan Setiausaha Kehormat
5. Laporan Bendahari Kehormat
6. Membahas Usul Pindaan Perlembagaan
7. Membahas Usul Tergempar
8. Melantik AJK Pengurusan Sesi 2010/2012

“BERSAHABAT MELALUI UDARA”
Yang menjalankan tugas,
(9W2MYR NORUL AMIN BIN HAMSAN)
Setiausaha Kehormat ASTRA